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1. INTRODUCTION
Big-city governments are a fact of American life. Over 7.3 million
people live in the 309 square miles in which New York City's government
provides municipal services, and in 1989 74% of American employment in
the fur goods industry, 35% of the American employment of securities
brokers and dealers, and 22% of the American employment of entertainers
took place within these boundaries [Vilain, 1991]. Even the 25th largest
city in 1992, Austin TX, had 492,000 people in an area of 218 square
miles. A political history of twentieth century America without, for
instance, John Purroy Mitchell, Fiorello LaGuardia, Frank Hague, Anton
Cermak , the Richard Daley's, and Carl Stokes would be seriously
incomplete.
Yet economics lacks a theory of what job big-city governments
perform and so it has no way of evaluating whether they are doing that job
well or poorly. According to the prevailing theory of local public finance-
-that first enunciated by Tiebout [1956]-- big-city governments are
either anomalies or mistakes. Bradford and Dates [1975, pg. 55], for
instance, compare the presence of an "incurable central city" to the
presence of an incurable monopoly.
Tiebout's theory, roughly speaking, combines a normative conclusion
that metropolitan areas ought to have a large variety in the types of local
public goods being produced with a positive insistence that what ought to
be is pretty close to what actually is. Large jurisdictions seem to
preclude or at least reduce this variety, and so writers in the Tiebout
tradition cannot explain why they exist.
What's wrong here? Jurisdictions and services are not the same
things. Tiebout's is a theory about local public goods, not about local
governments. Just as General Motors produces both Geo's and Cadillac's
and supermarkets sell both yogurt and hamburger, no physical constraint
keeps a single government from providing different local public goods to
different areas within its jurisdiction. I do not believe that New York
City provides the same level of protection against tuberculosis in Little
Neck as it does in Central Harlem, and I cannot even think of what it would
mean to provide "the same level" of leaf collection services in both
Chinatown and Tottenville. A fortiori. I cannot accept a physical
constraint that enforces a uniformity I can neither observe nor imagine.
The first problem with Tiebout theory, then, is not simply that it
does not explain big-city governments, but that it does not explain local
governments at all. Mexico City, the largest city in the world, is run
directly by the central government; there is no reason why Scarsdale,
Beverly Hills, and Evanston should not be also, if diversity in local public
good supply is the only desideratum. Just as a supermarket manager
supplies a wide variety of foodstuffs, an upper level government could
supply a wide variety of local public goods without the extravagance of
local governments. Bewley's [1981] results on endogenous political choice
within the Tiebout framework even suggest that the local public goods
supermarket might work better than the diversity of governments we
observe.
The second problem with Tiebout theory is less fundamental. An
explicit premise of this theory is that activities in one location do not
impose externalities on other locations. In a sense, this assumption
allows us to define relevant jurisdictions in a Tiebout world. Modern
urban economics, however, emphasizes the importance of increasing
returns to scale within cities (see, for instance, Henderson [1988] and
Glaeser et al. [1992] for contrasting views on the nature of those
increasing returns to scale). Increasing returns to scale mean that
externalities operating through production are likely to be pervasive
within a metropolitan area, and the Tiebout conclusion that a metropolitan
area is best organized as a collection of small, varied jurisdictions is
open to question.
To be slightly more specific, consider an urban area ~ downtown
Manhattan in the late 1800's, for instance -- where there are important
increasing returns to scale in production. These increasing returns can be
realized, however, only if more workers can be brought into the area, but
these workers can be brought in only if there is some place for them to
live. Roads, sewers, subways, schools and police services, therefore, in
the Bronx, Queens, South Brooklyn, and Staten Island give additional
Manhattan workers a place to live, and so give Manhattan firms a way to
realize increasing returns — in fact, they make the entire metropolitan
economy more productive. This productivity spillover from increasing
returns to scale is the pervasive externality to which I have been
referring, and it is the reason why the Tiebout conclusion is questionable.
This link with increasing-returns-to-scale production is why big-
city governments are not randomly distributed across the countryside, as
one would expect if they were anomalies or mistakes. Big-city
governments are found where increasing returns to scale are found; they
are centered (metaphorically if not geographically) on pieces of geography
where economies of agglomeration and urbanization are operating most
powerfully. Although the correlation is far from perfect (for reasons I
will explore later), it is not an accident that America's most powerful
urban productivity engine, Manhattan, is located in the political
jurisdiction with the largest population. New York City is large because
Manhattan is productive, not because people like to look at NYPD uniforms
or hate making right turns on red (these are just about the only public
goods I can thing of in New York City that are general throughout all five
boroughs). Most people, I think, have an intuitive feel for this relationship
between productivity and jurisdictional population, but it does not follow
from Tiebout's theory. Part of the task of this paper will be to put this
relationship on a rigorous footing, and to understand when to look for
exceptions.
Developing a usable theory of big-city governments thus requires
two steps: the organizational question of when we would expect to see
either unified or separate governments, and the externality question of
how increasing returns to scale in production make local public good
investments in one location affect land values in other locations.
Answering these two question is the goal of this paper; in this way I hope
to begin to construct a theory of big-city governments.
The latter question, the one about externalities, is easier and I will
attack it first. First I will construct a static model of a metropolitan
area of less than optimal size, and show how expanding city services to an
unserved region benefits all landowners. Then I will extend the model to a
dynamic context and show how the expansion of city services through
annexation should proceed.
The cities that are big today got big through annexation -- Jackson
[1985, pg. 141] writes that without annexation, "there would now be no
great cities in the United States in the political sense of the term" -- and
so any theory about big cities has to include a theory about annexation.
This theory of annexation stands in interesting contrast to Tiebout's
theory. Tiebout's theory is about a world of increasing returns in public
production but constant returns in private; the emphasis is on
consumption. Annexation theory is about a world of constant returns to
scale in public production and increasing returns in private production; the
emphasis is on production. Tiebout's theory views municipalities as
large-scale versions of clubs; annexation theory views them as large-
scale versions of plantations or company towns (or universities).
Annexation theory also helps answer one of the small nagging
questions of local political economy: why do businesses pay for
residential services like recreation, libraries and schools? Businesses
seem to be powerful lobbying groups in the other aspects of American
political life, especially in municipalities; why do they end up paying a
large share of the freight for residential services? The answer from
annexation theory is simple: because those residential services are
actually part of the production process. The sewers that dispose of the
wastes of a firm's workers are as much of an input into its production as
the sewers that dispose of its own wastes (for an interesting discussion
of this point in nineteenth century England and twentieth century LDC's,
see J. Williamson [1990]).
The static and dynamic models of annexation in the next two
sections of the paper, however, are largely silent on organizational issues.
Implicitly they assume that internalization is the only way to cope with
externalities; explicitly they assume there is some fixed cost, "loss of
responsiveness," to being "swallowed up" in a larger entity. Clearly these
assumptions need justification -- and qualification.
Section 4, therefore, discusses why internalization is often a better
solution for the inter-jurisdictional externalities involved than, say,
Coasian contracts or subsidies from higher levels of government. The key
issues here turn out to be observability and dynamic consistency.
Section 5 examines the costs of being "swallowed up" in a larger
entity. The goal is to formalize the intuition that smaller units of
government tend to be more responsive. This section, then, completes
part of the Tiebout program by deriving the argument for having large
numbers of small governments in a metropolitan area, not just large
numbers of different local-public-good packages (or local-public-good-
cam-distance packages as in Hamilton [1975]). Only by understanding the
advantages of a correctly specified alternative to big-city governments
can we understand why and when they are likely to occur. The results of
section 5 are also important for a more fundamental reason: they show
why we have municipal governments of any kind, big or small, rather than
just departments of one large over-arching government.
Section 6 concludes.
2. INCREASING RETURNS TO SCALE AND EXTERNALITIES: THE
STATIC VIEW
Consider an open city with all production in an infinitesimally-sized
central business district. The only direct input to production is labor, and
all output is sold on the world market at price one. Production in the CBD
is carried out by a large number of identical, perfectly competitive 'irms,
but there are external urbanization economies; the larger the population of
the city, the more productive each firm is. Specifically, each firm i's
production function is
i) - g(L) h
where Ij is the amount of labor employed by firm i, L is total city
employment, and g(L) is an increasing function that reflects economies of
urbanization and agglomeration.
Let w denote the wage. At a nontrivial equilibrium, obviously,
(1) w-g(L)
and each individual firm is indifferent about the size of its labor force,
and makes no profit.
Workers are identical. Each consumes one unit of standard variety
housing, and spends the rest of her income on food, which is available at
price one in the world market. Her utility depends on how much food she
consumes. The world level of utility is u. If R(m) is the rental cost of
housing m distance from the CBD, and c is commuting cost per unit
distance, migrational equilibrium requires
(2) u = w - R(m) - cm,
for all m where workers live. Just as constant returns at the firm level
assures no profit, costless migration at the individual level assures no
worker surplus. Hence any surplus must accrue to landowners, at least in
the long run.
All the land on which workers can live is located along an infinitely
long road that starts at the CBD; the city we are concerned with is long
and narrow. (All the results in this paper would hold for a circular city,
but the algebra would not be so clean.) Each worker's house takes up one
unit of distance; thus precisely m workers can live within m distance of
the CBD. There is no alternative use for land along the road. Workers can
live only along those sections of the road to which urban services --
paving, street lighting, sewers, city water - are being supplied. There is
no substitute for these urban services.
Let M denote the furthest distance along the road to which urban
services are being supplied. Suppose all sites less than M distance have
urban services, and none that are further away. Suppose also that all
sites with urban services are occupied.
Land market equilibrium requires
R(M)= 0;
the most distant worker forces no other worker to live further. From (2),
setting m=M,
(3) w = u + cM
This equation is essentially a supply-of-labor equation; it says what wage
is needed to fill a city size M.
On the other hand, the city's population is also M. Hence from (1):
(4) w= g(M),
which is a demand-for-labor equation. It says what wage employers are
willing to pay in a city of size M.
Let M* denote a city size that equates supply and demand, if such a
city size exists, and if the supply curve cuts the demand curve from
below, as in figure 1. M* is the size the city would have if urban services
were supplied costlessly by a benevolent and omniscient planner. (If
supply cut demand from above or if demand were always greater than
supply, the optimal city would be infinitely big; if demand were always
less than supply, the optimal city would be one that did not exist.)
Suppose, though, that for some reason (to be discussed in the next
section), for the actual value of M,
g(M) > u + cM
The city is "too small;" the demand wage exceeds the supply wage.
Demand-for-labor condition (4) will still have to hold -- if firms were
making profits from each worker, they would bid against each other for
the existing work force and the wage would rise until it equalled marginal
product. Workers would not gain from this bidding war, however, since
land owners would raise rents. Workers living at the CBD boundary must
achieve the world utility level; hence
u = g(M) - R(0)
and so
R(0) = g(M) - u
R(m) = g(M) - u -cm, ITKM
R(M) - g(M) - u - cM > O.
Now consider the benefits that accrue from extending urban services
by an infinitesimal amount dM. There are two kinds. First is the private
benefit to the land owner at that location:
Bp(M) = R(M) dM « [g(M)-u-cM] dM
If Bp(M) is greater than the cost of urban services, the land owner will
install them, but if it is less, he won't. The second benefit is external:
increasing M raises productivity g(M), which raises the wage, which raises
rent at all locations that are already settled. The social benefit is
Bs(M)=Mg'(M).
(This is the same amount that would accrue as profit to firm owners if
rents didn't adjust and wages stayed on the supply curve.) Even if
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[Bp(M) + BS(M)] is greater than the cost of urban services, the land owner
will not provide urban services if Bp(M) is less than their cost. In this
case, though, the other land owners would be better off if they subsidized
urban services on land owner M's land.1
This is the fundamental externality that drives this paper. Big-city
governments are an attempt to deal with this externality. Notice that the
externality is present in the same way if we are talking about a group of
land owners who constitute a small town, rather than a single
infinitesimally small land owner. Nor will the result go away if we relax
the assumptions about living conditions by permitting crowding and
residence without full urban services: more pleasant conditions will
attract more workers at the same wage, increase productivity, and
ultimately raise rents everywhere. If all that urban services do is make
life more pleasant, that still attracts more workers into the city at the
same wage, and so allows more urbanization and agglomeration economies
to be realized.
I am not arguing, of course, that the externality arising from
increasing returns to scale in production is the only externality that has
ever mattered in the determination of city boundaries. Consolidating the
harbor district, for instance, was one of the reasons why Staten Island
was added to New York City in 1898 [Hammack 1982]. But increasing
returns to scale seem to be the dominant externality.
3. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF ANNEXATION
Why would a city be too small? The simplest reason for a city to be
too small at a point in time is technological change: it may have been the
right size a little while ago, but new kinds of technology have made
n
expansion possible and desirable. The periods of rapid annexation in U.S.
city growth seem to coincide with periods of technological change, and so
technological change may be a reasonable force to drive city growth. In
this context we can also understand the development of suburban
governments.
In a metropolitan area where growth is expected, every small town
on the outskirts of a city has a choice. It can either wait for the city to
expand, annex it, and pay for the installation of urban services; or it can
install the services itself. Annexation carries with itself the one-time
cost of Q per unit distance for having less responsive government. I will
show in section 5 why Q is positive. Roughly speaking, political leaders
extract disproportionately greater rents in larger jurisdictions;
governments "closer to the people" work better. This idea has a
distinguished history in American political thought, and I formalize it in
section 5.
An independent town can also decide on its own when to install
urban services. Roads, sewers, street lights, water supply systems, fire
departments and schools all involve substantial capital costs, and so for
this section I will portray the installation of urban services as a one-time
capital investment. The actual decision is more complicated than that,
and these complications will play a crucial role in section 4.
The type of technological progress that is easiest to model is
reduction in transportation cost. In terms of the supply and demand
diagrams, a decrease in transportation costs swings the supply curve
downward as in figure 2, and increases the size of the city at which
supply equals demand. Since the city size is bigger and demand curve is
unchanged, lower transportation costs raise the wage also. Since the
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relationship between transportation costs and wages is so complex, we
will think about the passage of time as simply a force increasing wages.
Consider a landowner at distance m from the CBD trying to choose
the optimal time to develop, and trying to decide whether to develop as a
suburb or as part of the city. If he develops as a suburb, there will be no
subsidy, but no cost from less responsive government either. The timing
problem for suburban development is to choose time T to maximize
oo
J R(t,m) e-rtdt - se" r T
T
where s is the capital cost of installing urban services, r is the discount
rate, and R(t,m) is the rent at distance m at time t. The first order
condition for an optimum implies
R(T,m) = rs
Since
R(T,m) = w(T) -u - cm,
the first order condition can be written as the requirement that the wage
WB(ITI) high enough to induce development as a suburb is
(5) We(m) = rs + u + cm
When the wage reaches We(m), the land at m will be developed as a suburb,
provided it has not been developed as a part of the city already.
For development as part of the city, the reasoning is similar.
Assume the subsidy that the rest of the city is willing to pay for
development at m is equal to the full value of externality Bs(m), but that
the one-time responsiveness cost Q must be incurred. Then by similar
reasoning, the wage Wc(m) high enough to induce development as part of
the city is
(6) Wc(m) = WB(m) + Bs(m) - rQ
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Obviously a necessary and sufficient condition for a central city to
be surrounded by a suburbs is for Bs(m) to be greater than rQ for small m
and less than it for large m. For sufficiently large k, the Henderson [1988]
function
g(L) = k exp H>/L)
and the simple function
g(L) = k (1 - [1/L])
satisfy this condition. But the same result could also be achieved if, as
seems reasonable, Q (the cost of being swallowed up) were a sufficiently
rapidly increasing function of city size.
Thus the boundary of the city will end up at ftfl as defined by
Bs(lv1) = rQ.
Inside Ivi, land will be developed as part of the city when transportation
cost fall low enough that the prevailing wage rises to Wc(m); beyond Ml,
land will be developed as suburbs when the prevailing wage rises to
We(m). The city will keep annexing until its boundary reaches Ml, and
during this time all development will take place within city borders. Once
the boundary reaches Ivl, annexation stops and development is solely a
suburban phenomenon. Development never leapfrogs in this simple model;
new houses are always built right next to old ones.
Since Bs(m) is a decreasing function of m in the neighborhood of the
eventual urban-suburban boundary, the function Ws(m) rises more steeply
than the function Wc(m) in this neighborhood. If wages rise at a constant
rate over time, the rate of metropolitan growth must slow after
development hits the suburban boundary. Because the Ws(m) curve is
steeper than the Wc(m) curve, larger wage increments are needed to spur
the same amount of development. Ceteris paribus. metropolitan areas
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where the central city has reached its eventual boundary will be growing
more slowly than metropolitan areas in which the central city is still
annexing.
4. WHY ANNEX?
Annexation is not the only way to handle externalities. One obvious
alternative, for instance, would be for the city landowners to enter into a
contract with the suburban landowner to subsidize urban services in the
suburb. My neighbors' car alarms are a source of significant externalities
for me, but I am not therefore contemplating making my neighbors part of
my family. Why is annexation such a popular way of dealing with the
externalities of urban development?
I can think of two chief reasons. The first is future development.
Land at distance m might be at the urban border now, but in a few years
the border will move out to m'>m. Landowners at m will then gain from
urban services and subsequent development at m1 -- whether or not they
subsidize those services. The external benefits from development at m
are a public good for every landowner closer in. Annexation makes it more
difficult for annexed landowners to free-ride on future development.
The second reason is ex post opportunism -- the classic O.
Williamson [1983] rationale for organizational integration. If urban
services and development were simply a matter of a one-shot public
investment as we portrayed it in section 3, ex post opportunism could not
arise. The model in that section, however, omitted two features of urban
development that matter a lot for organization.
The first is that increasing a metropolitan area's labor force
requires private investment as well as public. Houses have to be built as
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well as roads and schools; plumbing as well as sewer and water systems.
The second omitted feature is that continuing habitability requires
continuing expenditures: water and sewer plants have to operate, police
have to patrol, teacher have to teach, firefighters have to be ready to
respond, street lights have to be lit, roads have to be cleaned and the snow
on them plowed, and all of these systems have to be repaired when
something breaks.
Together these two features create a problem of ex-post
opportunism. Suppose I build a house in Staten Island, relying on
Manhattan's government for sewer and water service. Manhattan's
interest is more workers for the CBD. Once I have built the house, it is
worthless without water and sewer. So Manhattan's government can raise
my water and sewer rates until the sum of the other operating costs and
water and sewer rates is just equal to rent; then I will continue to use the
house as a home for CBD workers, but I will realize no return on my
investment. Thinking about this scenario, I will not build the house unless
Manhattan's government can commit not to act opportunistically after I
have built it.
Putting such a commitment in writing is difficult. How could the
central city government commit itself, for instance, to a level of
policing? Notice that a contract to provide a fixed dollar amount to the
suburban town would not be acceptable to the central city: the suburb
would use the money for its own consumption, not for expanding urban
services and raising the metropolitan area's population.
Giving Staten Island a vote in citywide elections, in the city council,
and on the Board of Estimate, though, makes it less likely that the
citywide government will exploit Staten Island opportunistically. Direct
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provision of the urban services assures that they raise metropolitan
population. Annexation thus helps mitigate ex post opportunism by the
central city government as well as future free-riding by the suburban
government.
Neither of these problems would arise, however, if there were
neither a central city government nor a suburban one. A stronger upper
level government that controlled all of the metropolitan area ab initio
would avert all of these problems. It could decide the proper times to
deliver urban services to each part of the growing metropolitan area. In
the U.S., city and town governments are "creatures of the state"--their
powers are derived totally by delegation from state governments. The
contracting and externality problems I have been describing heretofore
would not have happened if this delegation had not occurred. Why then
were these creatures created? That is one of the questions I examine in
the next section.
5. THE ADVANTAGES OF SMALL GOVERNMENTS
No matter what size a jurisdiction is, the problem of government
accountability remains. Indeed, in the paradigmatic economic model of
accountability -- the principal-agent problem - the jurisdiction's
population is only one -- a single principal trying to control a single
agent. Local government is replete with agency problems: citizens want
their snow plowed, their garbage picked up, their streets patrolled and lit,
their fires extinguished, but it is very difficult for them to tell whether
public officials are putting their best efforts into accomplishing those
ends or relaxing on the job, hiring their incompetent relatives, and
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amassing publicity and campaign funds for attempts at higher office, and
enriching themselves from kickbacks from contractors.
One would think, therefore, that bigger jurisdictions would be better
because their citizens' experiences, collectively, would contain more
information about officials' efforts. Bigger samples are more
informative. Indeed, this relationship can be demonstrated rigorously
when the government has only two possible actions — working or shirking
-- and each citizen receives a signal from the same (symmetric unimodal)
distribution. In [1990] I showed that under these circumstances majority
rule was the unique nonmanipulable mechanism, and that the payment
required to make the official work rather than shirk was a decreasing
function of the square root of the number of citizens.
This result holds, however, only when citizens have identical
concerns about government action and all citizens' signals are drawn from
the same distribution—for instance, when the public official is providing
a public good to all of them. An example is a park used by everyone in the
town: the superintendent either works or shirks and everyone notices in
random fashion how well the park is maintained; but contingent on the
superintendent's either working or shirking, the quality of every citizen's
experience in the park can be thought of as a random variable drawn from
the same distribution.
Suppose, though, that the park had two parts used by different
people -- woods and fields, for instance. The superintendent could either
work or shirk in each part. Then the signals that woods-users received
would not necessarily be drawn from the same distribution as the signals
that the field-users received, since the superintendent could work in one
part and shirk in the other.
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Similarly and more relevantly, if the Mayor of New York City can
make separate decisions about policing Brooklyn and policing Staten
Island -- and we have argued in the introduction that he can -- then
Brooklynites and Staten Islanders can receive signals about policing that
are drawn from different distributions. Bigger samples would not be more
informative. On the contrary, incorporating the two boroughs into one
polity would hurt their citizens.
To show this, we need to formalize. Consider two sets of voters B
and I (for Brooklyn and Staten Island respectively). Assume that both |B|
and |l| are large and odd. Each Brooklyn voter receives a signal x about the
quality of city services in Brooklyn, and cares only about the effort the
Mayor makes in Brooklyn. Each Staten Island voter receives a signal y
about the quality of municipal services in Staten Island, and cares only
about the Mayor's efforts in Staten Island. These are the principals.
The agent is the Mayor, who decides an action to take in each
borough. In each borough he can either work or shirk. In the absence of
rewards he would prefer to shirk in both boroughs. Specifically, he
endures a private cost of CB if he works rather than shirks in Brooklyn, ci
if he works rather than shirks in Staten Island. We assume that, all things
considered, CB and ci are low enough, and the public benefits of working
high enough, that the efficient outcome is for the Mayor to work in both
boroughs, and ask about mechanisms that implement that outcome. To
simplify further, we assume the Mayor has no alternative employment, so
we need not include a participation constraint.
Whether the Mayor works or not affects the distribution of signals
voters receive. When the Mayor works in Brooklyn, the signals x that
Brooklyn voters receive are i.i.d. random variables drawn from a
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symmetric and unimodal distribution with mean and mode at ^i>0. Denote
the pdf of this distribution as fw(.)- When the Mayor shirks in Brooklyn,
Brooklyn voters' signals are i.i.d. variables with pdf fs(.), where fs(.) is
simply a leftward translation of fw ( . ) :
f sM = fw(x + 2n).
Hence the mean and mode of Brooklyn voters' signals is at(-ji) if the Mayor
shirks in Brooklyn.
Staten Island voters' signals have the same properties, mutatis
mutandis. The pdf for y is fw(.) if the Mayor works in Staten Island, and
fs(.) if he shirks.
The revelation principle [Gibbard (1973), Myerson(1985)] assures
that we need consider only direct mechanisms -- mechanisms where the
voters report their experiences to the center, which then orders payments
as a function of these reports. Let (X,Y) denote a vector of these reports;
the dimension of this vector is |B|+|I|. A mechanism M is a function that
assigns to each vector (X,Y) a non-negative payment M(X,Y) to the Mayor.
For any Staten Island vector of signals Y let p(Y) denote the set of
payments that might be made with that signal.:
p(Y) = {p|(9X)M(X,Y) = p}.
For any pair of a payment p and a Staten island vector Y, let Q(p,Y) denote
the set of Brooklyn vectors that give rise to payment p in the presence of
Staten Island vector Y:
Q(p,Y) = {X| M(X,Y) = p}.
For any vector of Brooklyn signals X, let FW(X) denote the probability of
that vector if the Mayor works in Brooklyn, and FS(X) the probability if he
shirks. Similarly, let GW(Y) denote the probability that y will be the
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vector of Staten Island signals if the Mayor works, and GS(Y) the
probability if he shirks. By independence, then , the probability of
observing (X, Y) if the Mayor, say, works in Brooklyn and shirks in Staten
Island is FW(X)GS(Y).
The Mayor will work in Brooklyn if and only if the expected return
from doing so is greater that the expected return from shirking. The
expected payment under mechanism M to the Mayor when he works in
Brooklyn and Staten Island is:
G W (Y) p | F w ( X ) d X d p d Y = Pww(M)
XeQ(p,Y)
pep(Y)
Define Pws(M) and Psw(M) analogously. Since we are interested in
mechanisms that induce the Mayor to work in both places, the Brooklyn
part of the mechanism must be designed to induce the Mayor to work in
Brooklyn when he is also working in Staten Island. Hence the relevant
condition for working in Brooklyn is
Pww(M) - CB - ci > Psw(M) - ci
or
(5) Pww(M) - Psw(M) > cB
and the relevant condition for Staten Island is
(6) Pww(M) - Pws(M) > ci
A mechanism M is called wasteful for Brooklyn if (5) is a strict
inequality; M is wasteful for Staten Island if (6) is a strict inequality.
Suppose that a mechanism is wasteful for Brooklyn. Then any Brooklyn
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voter could propose an alternative mechanism that paid the Mayor less in
certain states and he would still work. All Brooklyn voters, since they
pay less and receive just as good services, would agree to this new
mechanism. But a wasteful mechanism need not lead to a formal revision.
If the wasteful mechanism were not revised, some or all of the Brooklyn
voters could extort a bribe from the Mayor for the privilege of being
mayor, and no one else would object (except out of jealousy) or some
group of Brooklyn voters could sometimes report their experiences
untruthfully if they were not bribed not to. I do not need to be explicit at
this point about what happens when a mechanism is wasteful; instead I
will look for mechanisms that are not wasteful.
Wastefulness, though, is only a sufficient condition, not a necessary
one, for instability, bribery, and chicanery. Call a mechanism M* a
Brooklvn-replica of mechanism M if, whenever M*(X, Y)=p for any (X, Y) and
p, there is some Z such that M(Z, Y)=p. Brooklyn voters, acting on their
own, could change M into any of its Brooklyn replicas, simply by reporting
Z whenever their experiences were really X. A mechanism M is Brooklyn-
manipulable if any of its Brooklyn-replicas is wasteful. If a mechanism
were Brooklyn-manipulable, someone could convincingly tell the Brooklyn
voters: "Report your experiences to me instead of to the center. If you
report X to me, I will report Z to the center, and so forth. In this way we
will make a Brooklyn-wasteful mechanism M*. Then we can extort a bribe
from the Mayor, who will still work, or just simply reduce our payments,
and all of us will be better off."
Define Staten-lsland-manipulability analogously. A mechanism is
nonmanipulable if it is neither Brooklyn- nor Staten-lsland-manipulable.
The primary result of this section is that decentralized majority rule is
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essentially the only nonmanipulable mechanism. By decentralized
majority rule I mean a mechanism where each voter votes "yes" if and only
if her experience was positive; and the Mayor receives one amount pe if
the majority of Brooklyn votes are "yes" and a majority of Staten Island
votes are not; another amount pi if the opposite occurs; and the sum
(PB + Pi) if majorities in both boroughs votes yes. Since the consolidated
City of New York is not governed by decentralized majority rule, whatever
mechanism it employs must be manipulable.
To derive the primary result about nonmanipulability, rewrite the
left-hand side of (5)




S(X) = FW(X) - FS(X).
If M is nonmanipulable, it cannot be Brooklyn-wasteful,
Pww(M) - Psw(M) = cB
and so for any Brooklyn-replica M*
Pww(M*) - PSW(M*) < CB
Thus for any Brooklyn-replica M*
(7) Pww(M) - Psw(M) - [PWW(M*) - PSw(M*)] > 0.
Note that if M* is a Brooklyn-replica of M, p(y)=p*(y), and so (7) becomes
(8)
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jGw(Y){ p |5 (X)dXdp -
XeQ(p,Y)




Suppose some mechanism has the following property:
property (*): for every Y and its associated p(Y), Q(p,Y) maximizes
p Js(X) dX dp.
XeQ(p,Y)
pep(Y)
Then that mechanism is surely not Brooklyn-manipulable, because the
expression in curly brackets in (8) is always non-negative, for any
Brooklyn replica.
I claim that decentralized majority rule has property (*). First
suppose p(Y) has precisely one positive element. Then the problem of
choosing Q(p,y) to maximize (9) is simply the problem of finding a set of
Brooklyn experience vectors that maximize
J5(X) dX.
XeQ(p,Y)
This is the simplest, one-dimensional election problem, and it was solved
in O'Flaherty [1990, proposition 1]. The solution is simple: Q(p,y) should
include all these vectors and only those vectors where a majority of
Brooklyn voters have positive experiences. (The intuition is that this
mechanism makes the median voter's experience decisive, and the median
is the most powerful order statistic. The mean is more powerful, but is
not incentive-compatible.) Denote this solution as Qm.
Qm =
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If p(Y)={0}, then Qm still maximizes (9) trivially; any set would do
so. By construction, p(Y) cannot be empty.
Finally, suppose p(Y) contains more than one positive element. Let
p*>0 denote the largest element of p(Y) and p1 denote the smallest; it may
be zero. Then (9) is maximized by setting Q(p*,y)=Qm and setting Q(p',y)
equal to the complement of Qm.
To show that this solution is unique, simply note that any other
mechanism, when compared with a mechanism with property(*), would
have the expression in curly brackets negative for some Y; and could not
have the expression in curly brackets positive for any Y; and so would be
Brooklyn-manipulable.
Thus if a mechanism is not Brooklyn-manipulable, it must work like
this: for any Y, pay the highest amount possible if the Brooklyn
experiences are in Qm, and the lowest amount possible if they are not. By
similar reasoning, mechanisms that are not Staten-lsland-manipulable
must act the same way: for any X, pay the highest amount possible if the
majority of Staten Island voters1 experiences are positive, and the lowest
amount possible if they are not. Hence if a mechanism is not manipulable,
it can have only four levels of payment to the Mayor: nothing, if majorities
in both boroughs have negative experience; an amount pi if a majority of
Staten Islanders have positive experiences and a majority of Brooklynites
don't; an amount pe if the opposite occurs; and (pe + Pi) if majorities in
both boroughs have positive experiences. This is precisely how I have
defined decentralized majority rule.
Decentralized majority rule could be implemented if Brooklyn and
Staten Island had separate mayors and separate elections (it wouldn't
matter if the same person held both jobs; many small towns in New
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Jersey, for instance, share tax assessors and health officers). It could not
be implemented if Brooklyn and Staten Island were part of one city that
held city-wide elections. Thus the price of consolidation is electoral
manipulability.
How high is this price? Without an explicit theory of how
manipulate mechanisms get manipulated I cannot say. If communication,
information, and coordination were costless, manipulations could be set
up instantaneously and mechanisms would automatically become
nonmanipulable. The formal rules of an election would be irrelevant. But
manipulation is expensive, and proficient manipulators no doubt realize
rent from their activities. There may be efficiency losses as well
because some outcomes that are expensive for the Mayor cannot be
implemented.
Reducing the scope for manipulation, therefore, is why small
jurisdictions make sense. The costs of governmental consolidation that
we appealed to in section 3 are real.
6. CONCLUSION
Tiebout's theory provides many important insights into how local
public goods are and should be provided in metropolitan areas. But it says
little about either big cities or the organization of government. In this
paper I have tried to appeal to increasing returns to scale in production
and to information in order to explain big city governments.
The theory I have sketched is roughly in accord with the stylized
facts of big city development. The largest political jurisdictions tend to
be those that include areas where large economies of agglomeration and
urbanization are being realized. Those jurisdictions became large by
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aggressively annexing surrounding towns and areas-before those areas
were thickly settled (Staten Island had a population of 391,000 in 1992,
but the vote in favor of consolidation in 1894 was 5531 to 1505; Queens
with a 1992 population of 1,951,000 voted 7712 for and 4741 against
[Hammack, 1982, p.206]). Developed areas do not get annexed-witness
Minneapolis and St. Paul or the long coexistence of Manhattan and
Brooklyn. Rapid annexation takes place during the times when
metropolitan areas are growing most quickly, and then stops.
Metropolitan areas where cities are not annexing tend to grow less
quickly. The greatest support for annexation comes from downtown
business interests and the owners of outlying land (see Teaford [1979] and
Hammack [1982]). All of these stylized facts are in accordance with the
theory I have set out in this paper.
Many other puzzles remain. I do not know why neighborhoods that
get annexed tend to stay annexed-why secession is so rare in the annals
of local government. Perhaps subsidies continue; perhaps capital
structure is built in such a way that neighborhoods are locked in; perhaps
powerful political forces are realizing rent from the manipulations that
centralized government permits. This question is particularly important
for understanding cities like Newark where the original rationale for
annexation has all but disappeared (in 1990, only 46.6% of the workers
who lived in Newark went to work in Newark [U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1993]).
I do not know why state boundaries hardly ever change. Since 1800,
only two major state boundary changes have occurred (both in connection
with the Civil War -- the additions of Maine and West Virginia). State
boundaries prevented the New York and Philadelphia suburbs in New v'ersey
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from being annexed; that's why Hudson, Bergen and Camden counties in
New Jersey have such a plethora of geographically tiny communities. But
why those state boundaries did not change I do not know.
Free-riding by businesses--or more precisely, by owners of land on
which businesses are located--is another area that this paper has failed
to address, but which a full theory of local governments need to consider.
In this paper I have forced all businesses to locate in the CBD (where the
increasing returns to scale are realized), and since the CBD had an area of
measure zero, CBD land contributed nothing to the subsidy for
development. Considering a CBD with a positive measure of land and land
as an input to production would be a mindless extension of the model, and
would present not real difficulties.
Suppose, though, that there were a few other spots in the
metropolitan area outside the CBD where a small number of businesses
could also locate. Assume further that most of the increasing returns are
metropolitan-wide. Then businesses in these outlying islands could
benefit from residential expansion, but could avoid paying for it by
incorporating as separate jurisdictions~a classic free rider situation.
Teterboro, New Jersey is the most frequently cited example of a business
free-riding jurisdiction, but Asamoah-Duodo [1994] lists East Newark (a
town of six blocks around the Clark thread mill), Harrison, Hillside,
Belleville, and Irvington as industrial towns that surrounded Newark in
the late nineteenth century. Gordon [1977] also emphasizes business free-
riding in his story of why annexation ended in the east.
A final weakness in this paper is its treatment of government output
as single good. Governments provide many different goods-fire
protection, police, sewers, water, schools, libraries, parades, holiday
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celebrations-and no physical constraints requires that the same
government provide all of them to a location. Annexation need not be a
yes-or-no question. Indeed, Jackson [1995, p.152] and Teaford [1979, pp.
80-81] have argued that the rise of special purpose multi-jurisdictional
districts, especially those for sewers, at the turn of the century was in
part responsible for the cessation of annexation in the East and Midwest
at about that time. But in fact there are good organizational reasons to
consolidate public services that affect the same group of people: the same
non-manipulation criterion that argues for separate elections when
separate groups of people are affected by distinct decisions also argues
for a single election when the same group of people are affected by
distinct decisions. I state and demonstrate this proposition rigorously in
[1995]. Towns should be small, but they should have many functions.
Thus in most cases special districts act like subcontractors to
municipalities. A town may buy its firetrucks from La France, but voters
hold local officials responsible for the performance of those firetrucks,
not La France. Thus we do not think of the United States as a consolidated
"firetruck district" governed by La France. Municipal accounting systems
treat payments to special districts like Passaic Valley Sewerage
Commissioners the same as payments to La France; this is probably the
right way to think about the Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners.
Like La France, special districts are generally a way of helping local
elected officials do their jobs; they may do so well or poorly. (Multi-
jurisdictional public utilities like water companies and cable television
systems should probably be treated the same way; so should the Compton
Plan.)
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Why should anyone care how big cities are governed? Public health,
physical security, and education are areas of great concern. Big-city
governments provide these services to large numbers of people -- and
especially, to large proportions of poor people and African-Americans.
Only with a theory about why big-city governments exist and how they
operate can we begin to ask how well they do this job and whether
alternative arrangements could do it better.
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Note
1. Only land owners gain from development because in this model, as in
almost all the literature on monocentric open cities, land owners are the
only people who can gain (or lose) from anything. Slightly more generally,
any owner of a location-specific asset in fixed supply can gain, and so has
an incentive to promote development. Thus owners of utility franchises
were often among the more aggressive proponents of annexation. (See, for
instance, Asamoah-Duodo [1994] for the case of Irvington, N.J.)
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